“Democracy” is high on the list of blur-begetters – not a weasel word so much as a huge rampaging Kodiak bear of a word. The conception is, of course, Greek. Athenian democracy commonly gets high prestige in the sense that the idea, and to some degree the practice, later became widespread – or widely proclaimed – in the West. Pericles, praising the Athenian system, is especially proud of the fact that policies are argued about and debated before being put into action, thus, he says, avoiding “the worst thing in the world,” which is to rush into action without considering the consequences. And, indeed, the Athenians did debate and discuss, often sensibly. One trouble was, and presumably is, that debate can be influenced by plausible but misleading rhetoric.
It was a matter of the free vote by the public (though confined to males and citizens). This has been compared to the early New England town meetings or those of Swiss rural cantons. And clearly there are limits to the number of possible participants.
Its faults are almost as obvious as its virtues. And examples are many – for instance, the sentencing of Socrates (who lost votes because of his politically incorrect speech in his own defense). Or the Athenian assembly voting for the death of all the adult males and the enslavement of all the women and children of Mytilene, then regretting the decision and sending a second boat to intercept, just in time, the one carrying the order. Democracy had the even more grievous result of procuring the ruin of Athens, by voting for the disastrous and pointless expedition to Syracuse against the advice of the more sensible, on being bamboozled by the attractive promises of the destructive demagogue Alcibiades.
Even in failure, the thought-fires it set off went on burning. But the views it posed did not really return to Europe and elsewhere until a quarter of a millennium ago. Thus it was not its example but its theory that hit the inexperienced thinkers of the European Enlightenment. Unfortunately, the inheritance was less about the Periclean need for debate than about the need to harness the People (to a succession of rulers). And though the broader forces of real consensual rule began to penetrate, from England and elsewhere, they had to compete in the struggle for the vote with inexperienced populations and “philosophical” elites.
The revival of the concept of democracy on the European continent saw this huge stress on the demos, the people. They could not in fact match the direct participation of the Athenian demos, but they could be “represented” in principle by any revolutionary regime claiming to do so – often concerned, above all, to repress “enemies of the people.” Also, the people, or those of military age, could be conscripted in bulk – the levée en masse that long defeated more conventional armies. As the nineteenth century continued, the people could be polled in plebiscites and thus democratically authenticated. Napoleon III, of course, relied on this, and it is clear that he actually had high majority support. Marx himself wrote that in the Second Empire, the rulers had to some degree a certain autonomy from any economic class. The peasant majority endorsed them; the state machine was theirs. In any case, the new orders, democratic or not, now had to seek, or claim, authentication by the people, the masses, the population.
Harpooning some word-whales [fragment]
uit: The dragons of expectation : reality and delusion in the course of history - Robert Conquest
















